Cost‐sharing in directed networks: Experimental study of equilibrium choice and system dynamics
通过实验研究有向网络中成本分摊带来的正外部性，发现同质成本下半数群体收敛到有效均衡，而异质成本下无一收敛，且中间均衡和远见策略教学促进了收敛。
Abstract This study reports the results of an experiment on directed networks with positive externalities induced by cost‐sharing. Subjects participated in a network game in which they had to choose between private and public transportations. If a player chose public transportation, then she shared the travel cost equally with other players making the same choice, whereas if she chose private transportation, then her travel cost was fixed. Travel costs on the private route were manipulated across the two experimental conditions. In one condition, these costs were homogeneous among players; in the other condition, they were heterogeneous among players and only privately known. We found that half (none) of the player groups in the homogeneous (heterogeneous) condition converged toward the efficient equilibrium. Examination of the system dynamics shows that convergence toward efficiency was facilitated by: (1) the existence of an intermediate equilibrium choice; and (2) strategic teaching by which a farsighted player chooses strategies with poor short‐term payoff in order to shift group decisions to the efficient equilibrium and thereby increase her own long‐term benefit.