Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty
研究了一个信号传递模型，其中成年人掌握社会主流规范的信息，而儿童通过观察父母行为来推断规范，导致成年人行为出现信号扭曲，即使没有利益冲突也会鼓励儿童采取最安全的行为。
Abstract We consider a signaling model in which adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parents as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way (i.e., the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm). We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.