Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality: A Theory of Domino Effects*
提出工会减少工资差异的动机是公平与策略的混合，通过效率工资下的多米诺效应，工会优先提高低工资，雇主为保护效率差异而提高高工资，从而可能提升中位工资。
Abstract Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences. I demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy, maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages. Unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages, and still not sacrifice higher wages much, if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency‐enhancing wage differences. If these “domino effects” are strong enough, then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage.