Knowing When to Quit: Default Choices, Demographics and Fraud
利用政府诉讼创造的自然实验，研究默认取消与主动取消对消费者退出欺诈性订阅计划的影响，发现默认取消显著提高退出率，且低收入、低教育地区消费者在主动取消时表现更差。
We study defaults in a novel setting where the optimal choice is clear: the decision to escape from fraud. A government lawsuit created a natural experiment whereby some consumers enrolled in a fraudulent subscription programme were cancelled by default, while others had to cancel actively. We find that cancelling subscriptions by default increased cancellations to 99.8%, 63.4 percentage points more than requiring active cancellation. We also find that consumers residing in poorer, less‐educated Census blocks were more likely than average to cancel prior to the lawsuit but were less likely to actively cancel when notified they could do so.