Mexico–U.S. Immigration: Effects of Wages and Border Enforcement
构建离散选择动态规划模型，利用墨西哥移民项目数据，研究相对工资和边境执法如何影响墨西哥向美国的移民决策，发现工资上涨减少移民，执法加强则降低移民率但延长停留时间。
In this article, I study how relative wages and border enforcement affect immigration from Mexico to the U.S. To do this, I develop a discrete choice dynamic programming model where people choose from a set of locations in both the U.S. and Mexico, while accounting for the location of one’s spouse when making decisions. I estimate the model using data on individual immigration decisions from the Mexican Migration Project. Counterfactuals show that a 10% increase in Mexican wages reduces migration rates and durations, overall decreasing the number of years spent in the U.S. by about 5%. A 50% increase in enforcement reduces migration rates and increases durations of stay in the U.S., and the overall effect is a 7% decrease in the number of years spent in the U.S.