Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts
通过实验室实验发现，参与法定人数和批准法定人数两种规则都会降低投票率，尤其增加支持现状者的选举抵制行为，且参与法定人数的抑制效应更强。
Abstract Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.