Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
证明在私有品分配中，许多策略证明规则也满足群体策略证明性，从而缓解了激励与效率的传统冲突，并揭示了这一等价性背后的共同结构。
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds.