Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
提出一种新方法研究企业内部谈判，基于合同无法约束企业与员工工资和就业的假设，分析不可重新谈判的均衡结果，发现企业利润可表示为新古典利润与夏普利值推广的加权平均，并导致投入和组织设计决策的显著扭曲。
The authors present a new methodology for studying the problem of intrafirm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. They develop and analyze a general noncooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party. Equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo-classical (nonbargaining) firm's profits and a generalization of Shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game. Furthermore, the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm's input and organizational-design decisions. Copyright 1996 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.