Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans: Evidence from Proxy Voting
研究了公司是否出于管理层控制动机而在固定缴费计划中提供公司股票，发现员工持股与管理层提案的投票支持率正相关，表明管理层鼓励员工持有公司股票以获取更多投票支持。
I examine whether firms’ decisions to offer company stock in defined contribution (DC) plans are explained by managers’ corporate control motives. Using a large sample of proxy voting outcomes, I find that employee ownership in DC plans is significantly and positively associated with the level of voting support for management‐sponsored proposals. This suggests that managers encourage employee DC holdings in company stock in order to receive higher voting support in favor of management. The effects of employee ownership on voting outcomes are significantly greater in specific subsamples where employee vote is more important to management.