Fee-Screen Reimbursement and Physician Fee Inflation
利用1973-1978年蓝盾计划的保险索赔数据，检验医生费用表膨胀假说，发现现行Medicare和蓝盾UCR报销制度鼓励过度涨价。
Empirical tests of the physician fee-screen inflation hypothesis are applied to insurance claims data for three Blue Shield plans for 1973 to 1978. A framework for physician pricing behavior is developed, which includes a two-period model of inflationary pricing based on fee-screen updating, and some alternatives, including a myopic (single-period) price formulation model. Each of these models is shown to be a testable parameter subset of the general estimation equation. The results generally conform with the fee-screen inflation hypothesis, suggesting that the current Medicare and Blue Shield UCR physician reimbursement systems encourage excessive price increases.