Empirical Application of Optimal Commodity Tax Theory to Taxation of Alcoholic Beverages
研究了如何计算含有共同外部性成分的商品的最优税收，并用芬兰酒精消费数据展示了控制与收入需求之间的权衡如何影响税率。
This paper concerns the calculation of optimal taxes on commodities that contain a common externality-generating component. The first-best solution is characterized by a form of marginal cost pricing with production costs increased according to the harm content of commodities valued at marginal external cost. An application to Finnish alcohol consumption data is made to indicate how the trade-off between control and revenue requirements affects taxes. By bootstrapping the estimates, taxes are found to be less sensitive than compensated elasticities. Copyright 1992 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.