Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers
在一个政府不完全了解消费者类型（如健康与残疾）的简单模型中，研究了次优（实物转移）和第三优（补贴与税收）的帕累托最优，发现这些最优依赖于自我选择，且次优最优只能通过配给实现，第三优最优则被次优最优帕累托占优。
This paper investigates second-best (transfers in kind) and third-best (subsidies and taxes) Pare to optima in a simple model were government lacks full information ab out consumer types (who is able, who is infirm). These Pareto optima rely on self-selection. The authors show that those second-best Paret o optima which are not also first-best (some do exist) can only be su pported by rationing. They also show that every third-best optimum, o ther than the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium, is Pareto-dominated by some second-best optimum. In addition, standard "willingness-to- pay" cost-benefit tests are inappropriate in this environment. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.