A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting
分析投资者为缓解经理激励问题而设置财务约束，但竞争对手可能故意压低企业业绩以触发约束、迫使企业退出。最优契约需权衡放松约束以遏制掠夺与加剧激励问题之间的成本。
By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm's performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. The authors analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.