A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
通过实验室实验，研究不同呈现方式（展开式与标准式）对两人决策问题中策略选择的影响，发现呈现效应在简单博弈中最显著，且单阶段呈现更易引发不可置信威胁。
This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026,215.