Deficient Foresight: A Troublesome Theme in Keynesian Economics
审视凯恩斯关于经济决策中不确定性的观点，质疑其具有颠覆性分析后果的说法，认为该问题要么无害要么无差别破坏，取决于如何处理。
The fact that John Maynard Keynes had made a distinguished contribution to the theory of probability (1921) no doubt predisposed many of his readers to imbue with great significance his subsequent remarks on the related topic of uncertainty in economic decision making. Among those who have provided commentaries on his work, there are those who have singled out this uncertainty theme not only for its special importance, but also for its potential for analytical subversion. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the ideas involved in this particular aspect of Keynes' work, together with the lines of argument that have emerged from those commentators who have pursued it. The result of this scrutiny will be to call into question the idea that there is anything peculiarly subversive in the analytical consequences of broaching problems of uncertainty in economic decision making. I shall argue, rather, that as an analytical issue it is -depending on how it is handled-either innocuous or else quite indiscriminately destructive.