The Greek Stabilization of 1944-46
通过分析1944-1946年希腊的恶性通胀稳定化过程，检验不同经济学派关于稳定化成本的观点，发现希腊的稳定化耗时一年多才实现，与其他快速成功的案例形成对比。
It is a matter of great contention among economists whether economic stabilization programs can be instituted without imposing high real costs. Those believing in the core or underlying rate of inflation hypothesis argue that relying only on conventional monetary and fiscal policies will impose high costs. The rational expectations proponents, on the other hand, argue that a convincing antiinflation program will likely minimize these costs as economic agents respond to a genuine regime change or change in the rules under which monetary and fiscal policies are conducted.' A way of discriminating between these contending views is to examine the stabilization phase of the world's episodes of hyperinflation. Thus far, the work of Thomas Sargent (1982) on the post-World War I experiences in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, and William Bomberger and myself (1983) on post-World War II Hungary have adduced evidence in support of the rationalists' view. Price level stability was achieved rapidly without a prolonged period of high unemployment. The Greek stabilization of 1944-46 is not so straightforward and, as such, provides an interesting contrast to the other episodes. Its' unique feature is that price level stability took over a year to achieve following the initial reform of November 11, 1944. It was not achieved until, in a third reform in early 1946, the Greek 1018 1024