Institutions and the Resource Curse
认为制度质量是解释自然资源丰富国家成败的关键：在掠夺性制度下资源降低收入，在生产性制度下资源提升收入，并验证了制度对资源诅咒的决定性作用。
Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. We claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. More natural resources push aggregate income down, when institutions are grabber friendly, while more resources raise income, when institutions are producer friendly. We test this theory building on Sachs and Warner's influential works on the resource curse. Our main hypothesis - that institutions are decisive for the resource curse - is confirmed. Our results contrast the claims of Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.