Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
研究了两个玩家在只有一阶理性知识时，通过宣布可能承诺的讨价还价姿态来分割剩余，并确定了玩家能保证的最小份额与承诺概率的关系。
Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first-order knowledge of rationality is determined (as a function of her probability of becoming committed), as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. This “maxmin” share of the surplus is large relative to the probability of becoming committed (e.g., it equals 30% if the commitment probability is 1 in 10 and equals 13% if the commitment probability is 1 in 1000), and the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement.