Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
在一个无限期完美信息博弈中分析临时保护的可靠性，发现所有纯策略子博弈完美均衡都是周期性的，其中一个能实现最优临时保护，但该均衡不满足“重新谈判证明”的可靠性标准。
The credibility of temporary protection is examined in a simple infinite horizon, perfect information game of timing in which the domestic government uses the threat of future liberalization to induce the domestic firm to invest. All pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria are cyclical and, surprisingly, one of them implements optimal temporary protection. However, this equilibrium fails to pass another credibility criterion called "renegotiation-proof." The game has a unique stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.