Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
研究双人无限重复博弈中，在私人监测且无法沟通的条件下，折现因子接近1时的效率可持续性，证明囚徒困境的民间定理，并说明价格设定双头垄断中卡特尔合谋的可持续性。
We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology. We show the folk theorem for the prisoners' dilemma with conditional independence. We also investigate more general games where players' private signals are correlated only through an unobservable macro shock. We show that efficiency is sustainable for generic private signal structures when the size of the set of private signals is sufficiently large. Finally, we show that cartel collusion is sustainable in price-setting duopoly. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.