Are incentives without expertise sufficient? Evidence from fortune 500 firms
研究财富500强企业董事会，发现缺乏高层经验但持股较多的董事与企业价值负相关，且此类董事越多负效应越强；他们离任后企业价值上升，表明仅有激励而无专长难以提升企业价值。
Agency theory predicts that incentives will align agents' interests with those of principals. However, the resource‐based view suggests that to be effective, the incentive to deliver must be paired with the ability to deliver. Using F ortune 500 boards as an empirical context, this study shows that the presence of directors who lack top‐level experience but own large shareholdings is negatively associated with firm value, an effect that increases in the number of such directors. Firm value rises after such directors depart from boards, with the greatest increases occurring when many of these directors leave. While agency theory highlights the importance of the right incentives being in place, this research suggests that this can be ineffective if the right resources are not also in place . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.