Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program
研究1982年《职业培训合作法案》下联邦官僚机构中的激励机制，发现官员为追求个人奖励可能损害社会福利，并探讨市场式问责机制在政府中的适用性。
This paper studies the provision of incentives in the large federal bureaucracy created under the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. We find that bureaucrats respond to these incentives by maximizing their private rewards, possibly at the expense of social welfare. We argue that the inability to perfectly measure bureaucratic output is the root of this dysfunctional behavior. In addition, we find that the incentive designers adjust and perfect the incentive system as they receive information about dysfunctional behavior. In light of our findings, we discuss the prospects for successfully implementing in government organizations accountability mechanisms associated with the market sector.