ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRICE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
研究了自然垄断的价格激励机制，基于政府缺乏企业成本与市场需求信息这一现实，设计仅使用公开信息的调整过程，并比较不同制度环境对效率和分配的影响。
The paper contains incentive mechanisms for the control of natural monopoly. They are based on the observation that government lacks information on industry costs and market demands which the managers of natural monopoly firms hold. Thus, all mechanisms only make use of publicly accessable information. They are all adjustment processes derived from the common principle to share the benefits of quantity weighted price reductions between the firm and the public. Differences between the mechanisms relate to their welfare objective and the institutional environment. Our findings show that the institutional environment does matter both as regards distributional consequences and the possibilities to reach efficient solutions.