A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms
通过实验室实验比较彩票、全支付拍卖和自愿捐款机制在提供公共品上的效果，发现基于奖品的机制（尤其是彩票）比自愿捐款更能克服搭便车问题，且彩票的捐款额高于全支付拍卖。
This article investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods. We focus on an environment characterised by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. Our analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, both overall and by individual income types. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.