Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences
在标准货币委托模型中证明，当央行行长偏好不确定时，最优线性通胀合约优于最优通胀目标，而合约与目标的组合能消除通胀偏差和供给冲击外的波动，但偏好不确定性会放大冲击导致的波动，从而恢复可信度与稳定的权衡。
Within a standard model of monetary delegation the authors show that the optimal linear inflation contract performs strictly better than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the central banker's preferences. The optimal combination of a contract and a target performs best and eliminates the inflation bias and any variability not associated with supply shocks. However, variability due to shocks is enhanced by uncertain central banker preferences. Quadratic contracts are shown to overcome this problem partly, but the advantages of delegation may still be dominated by the 'excess variability' due to shocks. Hence, the credibility-stabilization tradeoff is restored.