Performance Pay, Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*
研究绩效薪酬对工资不平等的影响，发现其会加剧非工会企业的工资不平等，但在工会密度高的企业中没有此效应，对欧洲国家影响较小。
Abstract Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.