Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency
研究发现机构投资者持股比例越高，企业养老金资金不足、虚增预期收益率假设以及养老金组合中持有自身股票的情况越少，且这种监督效应在持股集中、非短期或大型机构中更强。
We examine the association between institutional ownership and defined benefit (DB) pension decisions. We find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with pension underfunding, opportunistic increases in the expected rate of return assumption in the presence of underfunding, and significant ownership of the firm's own stock in the DB plan portfolio. Furthermore, these relations are stronger when institutional ownership is concentrated, when institutions are nontransient investors, or when institutions are relatively large. These results suggest that institutional investors are monitoring firm pension decisions, particularly those institutions with stronger monitoring incentives or resources.