Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
研究了卖家通过设定保留价竞争买家的模型，证明当市场变大时，卖家保留价会收敛到边际成本，并分析了买家数量对保留价的影响。
The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices freely. An important outstanding conjecture (e.g. Peters and Severinov (1997)) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper. More precisely, we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. I also show that if there is a high enough lower bound on the buyers’ valuations, then there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, if the number of buyers (sellers) increases, then the equilibrium reserve price increases (decreases) and the reserve price is decreasing in the size of the market.