HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*
分析了长期不确定性（如未来气候条件）如何影响特许权合同和组织形式的设计，发现不确定性导致企业延迟投入，加剧代理成本，并倾向于短期合同，对公私合作伙伴关系在气候敏感基础设施中的适用性持悲观态度。
We analyze how long‐term uncertainty, for example, regarding future climate conditions, affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal–agent context, with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability, and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm's effort creates an option value of delaying efforts, a course that exacerbates agency costs. Contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility. The possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short‐term contracts. Our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public–private partnerships in this context.