Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management
研究了公司被错误估值时，经理人如何通过应计和真实活动管理盈余，并配合内幕交易获利，发现经理人利用应计项目操纵盈余以配合股票买卖，且萨班斯-奥克斯利法案未能有效遏制此类行为。
Abstract We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.