Property Rights and Wages: The Case of Nursing Homes
运用产权理论分析工资决定，预测产权弱化会导致工资上升，并用美国养老院数据验证：利润最大化的养老院工资最低，而医疗补助报销的成本最小化激励越强，工资越低。
In this paper we develop the implications of the property rights theory of the firm for wage determination and test the model using data from the U.S. nursing home industry. The main theoretical prediction is that any attenuation of property rights will lead to higher wage rates for the firm's employees. The empirical evidence indicates that, indeed, profit-maximizing nursing homes do pay the lowest wage rates (for given quality labor), and that the stronger the cost-minimizing incentives provided by Medicaid reimbursement programs, the lower the wage rate paid by these nursing homes.