Efficiency Wages and Local Wage Bargaining
引入效率工资理论作为工资漂移谈判的基础，指出企业与工会谈判时考虑工资与收入的关系，而非仅分割固定蛋糕，对工资和就业的影响在数量和质量上均不同。
In the literature on wage drift, it is often argued that strikes or work-to-rule practices are used to force employers to pay a wage rate that exceeds the contract wage. Here, the authors introduce the efficiency wage argument as a foundation for bargaining about wage drift. Contrary to the view in most bargaining models, where firms and unions struggle to divide a fixed pie, given employment, they take the relation between wages and revenues explicitly into account. The implications for wages and employment appear to differ not only with respect to the order of magnitude but also in a qualitative sense. Copyright 1996 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.