Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
研究了固定数量寡头和内生市场结构下的排放税，发现内生市场结构下最优税可能超过边际外部损害，且许可证费加次优排放税比单一高税更能提高社会福利。
Emission taxes under both fixed-number oligopoly and endogenous market structure, which are the most relevant market structures for policy issues, are examined. In the latter case, and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition, the optimal tax could exceed marginal external damages, which implies that externalities generated by oligopolistic firms could be optimally controlled by overinternalizing environmental damages. Under endogenous market structure, a scheme consisting of a license fee and a second-best underinternalizing emission tax can increase social welfare as compared to the use of a single emission tax exceeding marginal damages. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.