Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's
比较了20世纪30年代严格与宽松监管下已投保和未投保储蓄机构的风险承担行为，发现道德风险逐渐显现，宽松监管下的机构更倾向高风险贷款，表明有效监管对维持储蓄机构稳定至关重要。
This paper compares risk-taking of insured.and uninsured thrifts operating under strict and less-strict regulatory regimes during the 1930's. Analysis of balance-sheet data indicates that while newly insured thrifts undertook less risk than their uninsured counterparts, possibly because of screening by deposit-insurance authorities, moral hazard emerged gradually. Insured institutions operating under relatively permissive regulatory regimes were more prone to undertake risky lending activities than their more tightly regulated counterparts, possibly because of screening by deposit-insurance authorities, moral hazard emerged gradually. Insured institutions operating under relatively premissive regulatory regimes were more prone to undertake risky lending activities than their more tightly regulated counterparts. Given the current system of deposit insurance, the results suggest that effective regulation and supervision will play a key role in maintaining thrift stability in the 1990s. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.