Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
通过三阶段实验，在模拟劳动市场中估计参与者的社会偏好和互惠关切，发现战略不确定性规避比公平更显著影响选择，且代理人偏好与委托人具有相似分配关切。
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents “choose to work” for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.