Do Firms Time Equity Offerings? Evidence from the 1930s and 1940s
通过比较1933-1949年间美国公司采用的包销与配股两种股权发行方式，发现包销方式发行后一年内股票异常回报显著为负，而配股方式则无此现象，表明公司利用包销时机来利用市场高估。
We investigate whether the timing of equity sales to exploit market overvaluation may account for the reported poor post-offer stock performance of firms issuing equity. We posit that rights offers, targeted to a firm’s current shareholders, are less likely to be timed to exploit overvaluation. Our study compares firm commitment and rights offerings during 1933- 1949 when rights offers were common. We find that abnormal returns for firms electing the firm commitment method were significantly negative over the year following the offer, while those for firms using rights were not. This suggests that firm commitments were timed, while rights offers were not.