Competition or Compensation: Supplier Incentives Under the American and Japanese Subcontracting Systems
比较了美国式竞争招标与日本式长期合作两种分包体系如何解决质量控制问题，发现两种体系共存取决于安装成本与检验成本的比率，并解释了柔性制造和产品复杂化推动从美国体系向日本体系转变的现象。
Two fundamentally different subcontracting systems arise as distinct solutions to the quality control problem facing an input buyer. The "American" system involves competitive bidding on each contract, large orders, and inspections. The "Japanese" system involves repeat purchases from a supplier who earns a premium, small orders, and no inspections. Both systems may coexist as local solutions, but the global optimum is determined by the ratio of set-up to inspection costs. This suggests that the adoption of flexible manufacturing equipment and rising product complexity may be responsible for the shift from the American to the Japanese system observed in many industries..