Implementing Marketable Emissions Permits
探讨了美国环保局引入的泡泡、抵消和银行等污染控制方法，分析能否建立无需逐源审查的高效排放许可证市场，并讨论了参与者数量、竞争性、地理排放模式敏感性和交易灵活性等关键设计问题。
The Environmental Protection Agency is introducing bubbles, offsets, and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions. The new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances. This study examines whether an efficient market without source-by-source review is feasible. It considers the importance of enough participants, competitiveness, sensitivity to geographic emission patterns, and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits. The design features that address these problems are permit life, market definition, market initiation, and market operation. A stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk. 9 references. (DCK)