Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers
用一个允许进入和沉没成本的游说模型，解释为何政府扶持常流向衰退产业：扩张产业中进入会侵蚀租金，而衰退产业中沉没成本阻止进入，使输家更有动力游说。
Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industries, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriability of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy.