Strike Threats and the Bargaining Power of Insiders
构建了一个资本家与不可替代的内部工人两期模型，分析双方积累战略库存（存货与罢工基金）对罢工威胁可信度及均衡工资提议的影响，发现工人议价能力与存储成本、固定成本及企业盈利能力正相关。
A two-year period model consisting of a capitalist and an insider worker (who cannot be replaced) is introduced. During the first period the parties accumulate strategic stocks (inventory and strike fund, respectively) which can be used during a potential strike in the beginning of the second period. Each party then calculates the "ex ante" outcome of a strike and the costs of disagreement; with perfect information no strikes will occur. The conditions for the credibility of strike threats and the equilibrium wage proposals of the parties are derived. The bargaining power of the worker is shown to be positively related to the storage cost, fixed costs and the profitability of the firm. Copyright 1991 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.