Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions on Competitive Contracts
研究在买卖双方信息不完全的市场中，三种法律限制（如禁止银行拒贷、禁止高价、禁止消费者承担产品失败成本）如何改善资源配置效率，对法律与经济学研究者有参考价值。
In markets with many buyers and sellers, some of whom are imperfectly informed, legal restrictions on the terms of contracts may improve allocative efficiency. We examine three quite different forms of government intervention and show that in each case interference with what may appear to be competitive market outcomes may improve the allocation of resources. The contractual restrictions we discuss are: a) forbidding banks from denying loans to an entire class of borrowers; b) forbidding stores from charging prices which are high relative to the average price in the market; c) forbidding contract provisions which impose some of the cost of product failure on consumers.