The Implicit Incentive Effects of Horizontal Monitoring and Team Member Dependence on Individual Performance
研究团队工作中横向监督和成员依赖如何提供隐性激励，提升个人绩效，从而解释为何企业常设团队却不设团队奖励。
Abstract This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team‐based rewards.