Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis: Comment
评论了Tietenberg在1980年提出的可交易空气排放许可证策略，指出环保团体或工业方囤积排放权会阻碍工业增长，Tietenberg则回应了囤积对配置效率的影响并建议限制环保团体进入市场。
The author challenges a strategy for transferable air discharge permits proposed by T.H. Tietenberg in 1980 on the grounds that parties other than existing or new sources of pollution can participate in a free market and effectively remove portions of the environment from further development. A party with sufficient financial resources to stockpile emission rights could be an environmentalist bent on improving air quality or an industrialist planning his own future expansion. Both would stifle industrial growth. Tietenberg responds by exploring how stockpiling affects allocation efficiency. Since industrial stockpiling will eventually produce revenues, he suggests denying market access to environmental groups. (DCK)