Stock options and the strategic use of managerial incentives
研究在古诺寡头模型中，企业通过股票期权补偿管理层来影响竞争行为，发现股票期权的非线性特征会抑制甚至消除过度激进的竞争行为，从而影响市场均衡。
In Cournot-based oligopoly models there is an incentive for firms to pursue overly aggressive behavior, resulting in prices and profits below those of the Cournot equilibrium. Compensating managers in proportion to a combination of profits and sales provides one mechanism through which aggressive behavior emerges. However, when the profit component of managerial compensation comes in the form of stock options, the aggressive behavior is restrained or even eliminated in equilibrium. This result relies only on the nonlinearity of the stock option; generalizations to other forms of compensation are discussed. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.