Price Discrimination in Input Markets
分析投入品市场中三级价格歧视的短期和长期影响，发现更有效率的买家获得折扣，禁止价格歧视会损害大企业、抑制投资创新，且长期损害消费者利益。
We analyze the short‐ and long‐run implications of third‐degree price discrimination in input markets. In contrast to the extant literature, which typically assumes that the supplier is an unconstrained monopolist, in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand‐side substitution. In our model, the more efficient buyer receives a discount. A ban on price discrimination thus benefits smaller but hurts more efficient, larger firms. It also stifles incentives to invest and innovate. With linear demand, a ban on price discrimination benefits consumers in the short run but reduces consumer surplus in the long run, which is once again the opposite of what is found without the threat of demand‐side substitution.