Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey
研究了公共与私人保险并存环境下所得税和转移支付的最优形状，基于美国数据发现边际税率随收入递增，且累进税制比一次性转移更重要。
We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.