Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance as Instruments for Redistribution
分析了政府已实施最优所得税的经济中，引入最低工资和失业保险作为再分配工具对社会福利的影响，发现最低工资在弱条件下可改善福利，并探讨了与失业保险结合的条件。
The use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed. The government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability. The effect of introducing a minimum wage that induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions. Circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare-improving are also considered. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.