Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression?
研究加州强制公开市政员工薪酬后，高层管理者薪酬平均下降约7%，离职率上升75%，表明公众对高薪的厌恶比问责机制更能解释薪酬压缩。
This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial compensation, but not in cities where compensation was initially out of line with (measured) fundamentals. The response is more consistent with public aversion to high compensation than the effects of increased accountability.