Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market
研究美国实习生集中匹配市场（NRMP）中工资的形成机制，指出市场失灵源于工资差异化不足，而NRMP虽解决了匹配问题，却使医院能获取更多剩余，导致福利损失。
It is natural to ask why the market for interns in the United States of America has to be cleared with a centralized matching procedure (the NRMP) and how this rationing procedure affects equilibrium wages. This paper presents a model in which a market failure is caused by insufficiently differentiated wages. The NRMP solves the problem but it enables the hospitals to extract more surplus from their interns than they could in an ideal competitive equilibrium. It is demonstrated that this distortion causes welfare losses if the hospitals can substitute between physicians and interns. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.