Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment
研究委托人无法完全承诺支付时，如何设计合同以获取代理人建议，发现最优合同不会让代理人完全透露信息，且不会为不精确信息付费，偏好适度分歧时合同收益最大。
We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision‐making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (i) never induce the agent to fully reveal what he knows—even though this is feasible—and (ii) never pay the agent for imprecise information. We compare optimal contracts under imperfect commitment to those under full commitment as well as to delegation schemes. We find that gains from contracting are greatest when the divergence in the preferences of the principal and the agent is moderate.